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1. Introduction 
 
The paper presents a mainly theoretical survey of health care organization and financing models with a 
specific glance to the boundaries between public and private involvement in this sector. Indeed, health care 
supplies an exemplary “case study”, enlightening all the possible ways of designing and structuring the 
public intervention in welfare economics. In industrialised countries, the public intervention in health care is 
realised by several regimes of organization and financing, and none has an absolute supremacy over the 
others in terms of productive and allocative efficiency, equity and fulfilment of the implicit social rights. 
Therefore, for the economists, health care organization is a very ticklish and scientifically stimulating topic.  
In analysing and evaluating the various organizational and funding systems we cannot leave out some 
preliminary considerations about health care policy in the main industrialised countries. First, from the 
supply side, the sector is characterised by a long run costs inflation process, due to the shifting up of medical 
technological frontier and to the consequent dynamics of quality of care (Cutler 2002). Moreover, from the 
demand side, there is an expenditure shift due to population ageing and other demographic processes 
(Zweifel at al. 2009, ch. 1). Second, in health care sector there is a huge number of economic agents, with 
different and often conflicting preferences and interests, and consequently pay-off functions. Therefore, it is 
illusionary to treat this complex non-cooperative game like a unitary and centralised decision-making, as if it 
would be a cooperative game. Third, the outcome of any chosen organization is highly influenced by the 
flow of incentives among the agents. In this respect, for instance, a fully planned command & control 
systems, which are not as well incentive-compatible, can result deeply inefficient and even inequitable.  
Indeed, according to the modern economic theory, health care systems are successful in attaining their 
aims if they can optimally combine the incentives of physicians, patients, providers, and funding entities, for 
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producing and supplying health services at a quantitative and qualitative level coherent with the effective 
need, containing production costs and optimally allocating public and private resources among the agents 
themselves. Within each health care organization there are several principal/agent relationships with 
asymmetric information whose framework influences dramatically the decision making outcome. 
Consequently, it is crucial to have a system of incentives and delegations able to boost all the informed 
agents to choose strategies coherently with the objectives of the uninformed organization (Zweifel et al. 
2009, ch. 11).  
The distribution of incentives among economic agents, with different and independent pay-offs, roughly 
reminds a notion of competitive market, characterised by complex structures of demand and supply. In this 
regard, by many scholars of disciplines not in the field of economics the connection of market and 
competition notions to health care is considered as improper because not compatible with the social nature of 
the implicit rights. One of the aim of this work is to explain how the competition in health care can be 
compatible, not only with efficiency, but also with equity concerns. However, market and competition, must 
be considered as independent notions from privatization of health insurers and providers. Indeed, in some 
health care system (HCS), competition is fully running within the public sector of the economy, in the so 
called “internal markets” (Le Grand 2007).  
Consequently, we are going to show that the boundary between private and public in health care, 
not only is tough to disentangle, but it is neither an effective dimension for identifying and 
evaluating a HCS. However, we have to underline that the approach of this paper belongs exclusively 
within a economic theory context. Thus, we are not able to properly consider that the differences of HCSs, 
and particularly the boundaries between private and public, can be explained also by historical differences 
across countries and consequently by differences on individual preferences, life styles and values.  
The plan of the work is as follows. In section 2, the distinction between public (private) provision and 
public (private) production of health services is examined. From these two concepts, the design of the 
various organizational and financial models in industrialised countries obtains, given for granted that 
organizing industrially and funding a health care system are two different issues and two different economic 
problems, although, of course, linked each other. We also attempt to classify organically the several models, 
in order to include them in a restricted number of conceptual containers. In section 3, we are following a 
typical Industrial Organization (I-O) approach, enlightening the cost-benefit of separation or integration of 
conveying demand of care agencies (insurance companies, health districts) from productive and supplying 
entities (hospitals, clinics, fund-holders and medical laboratories). In section 4, we examine the various 
financing and social insurance systems, with a specific analysis of the so called multi-pillar regime which 
seems to be the prevailing mixed public/private system in Europe. In section 5, we present some European 
systems comparisons, according to the dimensions analysed in the paper (separation versus integration, 
different means of financing) and we concludes with some summarizing, although of course not conclusive, 
comments.  
 
2. Health care specificity and government intervention for provision and production of services 
 
2.1 Health services and individual well-being 
 
Health services, like general practitioner and specialised medical examinations, diagnostic tests, 
admissions to hospital, medicines, are devoted to treat a state of sickness, aiming at a adequate level of 
individual health (Culyer 1989). According to the classical notion coined by Amartya Sen, health is a 
functioning, extensively influencing, as liberty, nourishment and basic education, the individual level of well-
being (Basu and Lopez-Calva 2010, Fleurbaey 2009). However, the individual health level does not derive 
only from the consumption of health services, but mainly from the efficiency of a peculiar household 
production process, depending on his/her personal life style. The latter process, on the other hand, works in a 
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social context given by several meaningful variables, as the environmental conditions, the society level of 
knowledge and culture, the distribution of wealth, etc.  
With reference to microeconomics of consumption, health services are private goods, since they are both 
rival and excludable, but are not direct consumption commodities, as a loaf of bread or a glass of wine. They 
are, instead, intermediate goods, working as inputs in the household productive process determining the level 
of “health functioning” (Hurley 2000, Zweifel et al. 2009, ch. 3, Anderson and Grossman 2009).  
In formal terms, let define as m=(mk, k=1..M) the vector of M health services to treat a status of sickness, 
indicated by s, a measure of need. Then, let define with H the level of health reached by the individual, a 
measure of human capital stock (Grossman 2000, Becker 2007). Consequently, the individual i well-being 
may be represented as follows:   
 
(1)    Ui=Ui
 
(xi,Hi) 
 
(2)   Hi= hi(si,mi) 
 
According to (1), the level of utility achieved by individual i depends on the direct consumption of a 
private composite commodity xi, the numeraire, and by the functioning “health” Hi. According to (2), i 
“health functioning” depends on the initial state of health, si, combined with the use of M health services, as 
described by the production function hi(.), embedding as well the effects of environmental and social 
conditions and the life style.  
Any health service j has a positive, not-increasing, marginal productivity, 
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the relationship of complementarity or substitutability between services j and l. Notice as the marginal 
productivity ijh  formalizes the notion of “appropriateness” of j on health care of individual i, which is 
specified by the physician along the medical protocols.  
In this particular context, the consumer equilibrium is given by the following condition 
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According to (3), the marginal benefit of care throughout the service j, i
xjSMS ,  is a measure of 
willingness to pay, given by the marginal utility of health (in terms of numeraire), i
x
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weighted with the appropriateness index ijh .  
In equilibrium i
xjSMS ,  must be equated to the out-of-pocket individual’s cost of service, Pij, as a fraction 
of the producer price (marginal cost): .1; ≤= ijjijij MCP ηη   
Pij, is the opportunity cost for the individual i, so the lower is ijη , the lower is the strength of the scarcity 
signal sent to agent i. The size of the opportunity cost specifically reflects the health care financing system. 
In general, the fraction ijη  is less than one because the service is not paid at “full price”. According to the 
prevailing system, the financing of the (1- ijη )MCj may derive from insurance premia, or from social 
contributions, or from the general tax system funding a National Health Service (NHS). In the latter case, ijP  
is near to 0 as it may, at the most, include a moderate co-payment, (sub-sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and section 4).   
 
2.2 From the rationale of public intervention to health care systems typologies 
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The modern theory of Public Economics singles out a set of reasons for the public intervention in the 
organization and provision of health services. The motivations follow both efficiency and equity concerns 
(Hurley 2000, Zweifel et al. 2009, ch. 5). 
 
2.2.1 Efficiency and public provision of health care  
First, although, as said, health services are private goods, nevertheless they often produce positive 
externalities, as their benefits spread also to people not directly consuming them. Vaccinations and the large 
part of preventive medicine provide the most emblematic cases. By consuming only according to private 
economic calculus it would determine a social under-provision of the service, thus a public provision for 
internalizing the effects becomes socially desirable. 
Second, health services are often merit goods, for whom a social (paternalistic) preference is adding to, 
or even substituting, the private one. The merit good argument is linked to imperfect (myopic) individual 
evaluation of the benefit of a commodity consumption. When a health service has this feature, its consumer 
price should be subsidized, until, if necessary, the total exemption (sub-section 2.2.2 and Appendix, A.1). 
Individuals have imperfect information on the features and the expected benefits of treatments. In 
general, health services are experience goods, a specific category of commodities whose quality is, according 
to I-O theory, ex-ante unknown, and can be perceived only ex-post (Ba-Isac and Tadelis 2008, Belleflamme 
and Peitz 2010). In health care, it is the services productivity and efficacy to be unknown before the 
consumption. Sometimes health services tend to be also credence goods, when their quality is never 
ascertained. In this informational framework the crucial agency relationship between the physician (the more 
informed agent) and the patient (the uninformed principal) cannot be leaved to a private contract, unable to 
bound the former from inducing the latter to consume what and how he wants for personal aims.  
This argument might justify specific contractual relationships between the state and general practitioners, 
in order to increase the confidence by patients and also to reduce search costs (Mc Guire 2000, Dranove and 
Satterthwaite 2000).Such contracts have generally a private nature, in terms of a convention with the unions 
of the sector, which disciplines the extent of practitioners’ duties and their rewards.  
The individual, facing the possibility of health care spending, given uncertainty and risk aversion, has a 
clear incentive to buy insurance. However, in this context we have the well known cases of market failure, 
due to asymmetric information between insurer and insured. In particular, the phenomena of ex-post Moral 
Hazard (MH) given by “the third party purchasing”, TPP, context (Nyman 1999, Pauly 2000, Zweifel and 
Manning 2000, Chalkley and Khalil 2005), and of Adverse selection (AS) (Zweifel et al. 2009, ch. 5 and 6), 
generally imply the non-existence or the inefficiency of insurance market equilibria. In these cases a social 
insurance can guarantee, at some condition, welfare-improving equilibria w.r.t private second best Pareto-
constrained equilibria (Cutler e Zeckauser 2000, Zweifel et al. 2009, ch.5 and 6).  
In presence of MH, it can be shown that a risk-sharing equilibrium with partial coverage can be 
improved in a NHS organization by a higher coverage and by a system of controls, provided the 
decentralised entities are effectively constrained by “hard” budget constraints. However, a system of co-
payments may still be desirable for risk-sharing also in a NHS. In case of AS, it can be proved that a 
Rothschild-Stiglitz separating equilibrium (RSSE) can be improved by substituting it with an uniform 
average premium, a Community rating insurance (CRI) with cross-subsidization. Further, this average 
premium can be also substituted by a system of social health contributions, as payroll taxes, or by specific 
taxes dedicated to funding a NHS (section 4).  
A little bit of formalization on private insurance failure can be useful later on. Let us start with a ex-post 
MH-TPP context. With y=Y-pi-E+I=Y-pi-E+(1-k)E, 0≤k≤1, we represent the individual disposable income, 
equal to gross income Y less the premium pi and the health service expenditure E plus the benefit of insurance 
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(reimbursement), I= (1-k) E, where k is the coinsurance rate. u(y) is the status dependent wealth utility1, with 
the usual risk-averse hypotheses, and EU(y) the expected utility, where the “sick status” has probability p 
and the “healthy status” (1-p). The optimal second best coinsurance rate k*>0 (with a loading factor d) may 
be given as follows2: 
(4) 
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Condition (4) manages a trade-off between the aim of risk-sharing and the aim of controlling the level of 
over-spending in E, and it is similar to Ramsey inverse elasticity formula of optimal commodity taxation. 
The level of optimal coinsurance rate can be translated in a optimal co-payment, positively related to price 
elasticity; so it should be high for service with high elasticity and zero for services with zero elasticity 
(services for chronic pathologies and diseases)3. The alternatives to the co-payment, for controlling the MH-
TPP over-spending effect, may be the consumption rationing by lengthening the waiting lists (Gravelle and 
Siciliani 2008), harder budget constraints and taxes increase. All these alternative might be even more 
distortionary than the co-payment.  
Now let us have a look to a standard AS context. Given two types of individuals with high, h, and low, l, 
probability of illness, ph>pl, and with fractions of population respectively of λ and (1-λ). Let pii, i=h,l, be the 
premium for a contract giving a reimbursement Ii of the health service expenditure E, with Ii ≤ E. As said, the 
RSSE, with the share of low risks sufficiently small in order to guarantee its existence, implies a structure of 
premiums and insurance coverage as follows 
(5)   pih = ph E; pil = pl Il with Il<E  
while the social insurance Pareto-superior (both types are better off), in terms of mandatory pooling solution, 
may work with a CRI pa as follows  
(6)   pih = pa E = pil; pa = λ ph+(1- λ) pl  
where there is an implicit cross-subsidization taxes-transfers structure from l to h: 
tl=(pl-pa)E = -λ (ph-pl)E<0; th=(ph-pa)E =(1-λ) (ph-pl)E>0; λth+(1- λ)tl=0. 
The insurance market failure arises also for those individuals whose probability of illness is near to one 
(elderly people, poor and socially excluded individuals, chronic invalid individuals) which could be cream-
skimmed by private insurers. The coverage of these high risks can be guaranteed only by a social universal 
insurance system. 
 
2.2.2 Equity and public provision in health care 
Equity in health care pursues a notion of equity of outcomes, aiming at  guaranteeing the opportunity to 
reach a given level of health to all individuals, independently on their economic, social and territorial 
conditions and status (Williams and Cookson 2000, Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2000). The final objective 
is to allow human capabilities, such as the recovery of physical functionality, the absence of complications 
and a adequate life expectation, and to realise at least a decent level of health functioning. In formal term, 
using (1) and (2), the health care system should satisfy these two conditions: 
 
(7)   si = su  => mi= mu and then Hi= Hu iff hi(.)=hu(.)  
 
                                               
1
 This representation of preference may derive from utility function (1) and (2) by assuming that there is only a treatment and two 
health status (“healthy” and “sick”) and that the consumer, by purchasing the treatment, can precisely re-establish the healthy status 
before sickness (Hoel 2007).  
2
 The condition is obtained in many theoretical contexts. See for instance Cutler and Zeckauser (2000), Pauly (2000), Zweifel et. al 
(2009, p. 237-240). 
3
 The co-payment could be, of course, also personalised, i.e. graduated in terms of the income and the need of the patient. 
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(8)    si < su  => mi ≥  mu  
 
According to (7), if two individuals, i and u, have equal initial health status, they should have the 
possibility to access to the same vector of services and then to be potentially able to reach the same level of 
health. The sole differences should depend on the parameters of the household production function and then 
on the life style. According to (8), the individual i, with a worse initial health status than individual u, should 
accede to a vector of services with at least one component strictly greater. Thus, this principle of health 
equity tends to reduce the differences in the initial level of health along the basic equality of opportunity idea 
of “….more resources for less talent…”. However, the ways to actually reach, or approximate, this final 
result depend on some feasible intermediate objectives. Indeed, several notions of universalistic provision of 
health care are actually pursued by the various systems, especially for specifying the prevailing funding 
criteria.  
First, we have the simple notion of Equality of per-capita expenditure, when the funding of decentralised 
public bodies is designed to equate per-capita public spending, possibly weighted with socio-demographic 
variables. Second, we have the Equality in satisfying standardised needs, when the funding is referred to the 
notion of Essential levels of health care (ELC) and standardised costs per treatment. Third, it is frequently 
evoked the notion of Equality of access to services, essentially meaning that the providers are obliged to 
guarantee an equal treatments to patients, independently on individual risk (no cream-skimming) and income 
(no wealth discrimination). Finally, we may remind the concept of Equality of individual payments, when a 
uniform per-patient cost for health care treatments is required (no price discrimination). These intermediate 
objectives are actually attainable, but, could be conflicting each other and, in any case, they obtain only 
second best equity conditions, as they are imperfect and constrained respect to the first best one (fulfilment 
of a adequate level of “functioning health”). 
Particularly meaningful is the second notion, referring to the criterion of guaranteeing a essential 
package of care covered by public funding. For explaining this in Appendix (A.1) we’ll follow the merit 
good argument along a simple formal model (Schroyen 2005, 2010).  
 
2.2.3 Industrial configuration failure and public production of health care 
The previously mentioned equity and efficiency concerns offer the rationale for public intervention in 
terms of public provision of health services, i.e. by funding them outside price-setting, independently on the 
nature and ownership of the chosen providers. However, for some treatments, it may occur situations of 
“industrial configuration failure” where is socially desirable to join together public provision and public 
production as well. When it is convenient to localize services provision in urban areas where the private 
returns to invested capital are higher and there are economies of scale, local monopolies can easily take place 
for extracting spatial rents. Elsewhere, with lower expected returns, it may instead turn out a scarce network 
of providers and then an excess-demand of services.  
In these cases, the public sector should be engaged not only to funding the services, but also to providing 
them directly, in order to support a fair territorial distribution of supply. The inadequacy of supply and the 
rationale of public production also occurs when, in some territories, the network of private providers, 
although numerous ones, cannot supply high-quality services. In these cases of inefficient industrial 
structure, public production, if well organised, is justified both for efficiency and equity aims. 
 
2.3. Health care systems and coverage of risk disease  
 
The distinction between public (private) provision and production is crucial in order to analyse and 
classify the several models of health care. Indeed, the production argument allows us to talk about health 
care organization of supply, while the provision argument to talk about health care financing of medical 
expenditures. Both these two items contribute to define the features of a HCS. 
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We may distinguish two polar organizational cases: the Public system and Private insurance system. As 
far as the first one is concerned, there is the purest version, the so called Beveridgean model, which considers 
full public provision and production of health services, both financed by general taxation. Essentially, the 
English and Italian NHSs, before the reforms of the last two decades, were following this model. Also the so 
called Bismarkian model is a public model. It is the original social insurance model financed by health 
contributions going directly to public Health Funds. In principle, both Beveridgian and Bismarkian models 
are universalistic ones.  
As a Private insurance system we can mention that one presently still working in U.S.A. In this system 
there is a prevailing structure of private insurances policies and only some public programs for specific 
categories of patients and limited fractions of population: the Medicare for elderly people (over 65 years-old) 
and Medicaid for poor people (selected by means testing). This health care system is coherent with the 
concept of “residual welfare state” implying a limited coverage of every social risk4.  
The two polar models are now mainly academic ones and statistical outliers. For instance, all European 
countries are now applying mixed systems, where public and private programs are acting simultaneously for 
guaranteeing a universalistic provision of health services. Also the American system, according to the 
Barack Obama’s reform which introduces a set of innovations w.r.t. the previous Private insurance system5, 
is going to be transformed in a mixed one (Sullivan 2010). 
The long and deep discussion on this reform clearly has shown that, in order to evaluate the different 
systems, it is crucial to precise what is meant with degree of health care coverage of each one. However, this 
notion is not unique as it may be referred to: (i) the extent of coverage, i.e. the share of population whom 
health care is guaranteed; (ii) the depth of coverage, i.e. the number and the features of services included in 
the insured package; (iii) the highness of coverage, i.e. the fraction of treatment costs directly financed by the 
insurer or the NHE and then not directly paid by patients. This classification must be taken into account for 
avoiding confusions in looking for what is simply named a universalistic system.  
In order to distinguish the variety of mixed systems we have to consider several features. First, the 
criteria according to which the general practitioner (the agent who makes the order of purchasing the service) 
is assigned to each household. Then, the individual degree of choice of the provider by which to obtain 
health care services, as diagnostics and specialist treatments and hospital admissions, is meaningful. In this 
respect, there are systems allowing a high individual freedom of choice and other ones with a rigid 
assignment by public administration, but, of course, there are several intermediate situations. Another 
relevant distinction refers to the ways of paying the providers, i.e. if it is allowed an ex-post coverage of the 
production costs, or it is fixed an ex-ante budget, or it is organized a system of prospective standardised 
tariffs for each treatment (Appendix, A.2). Further, the mixed systems may be differentiated according to the 
forms of organizing the supply of drugs and to the ways their prices are established, and the co-payments and 
coinsurance rates structure is designed. 
According to these criteria, the literature in health economics usually distinguishes three specific types of 
mixed systems. The first one is known as the reimbursement model, where insurance companies or 
decentralised health districts (or regional governments) reimburse the patients expenditures, after they have 
paid, at administered prices, the services to public as well private providers. The second system is the 
integrated model, where the health district builds up with the providers a unique connected public structure. 
The patients do not pay for the treatments which are financed by taxes, but they have a limited or no choice 
                                               
4
 For Census Bureau about 46 millions of American citizens are not assured for illness risks. They are mostly less than 65 years old 
individuals and with a average income, so they are not covered by either Medicare or Medicaid. 
5
 First, Obama’s reform introduces some measures for protecting the insured individuals, or enrolled at a Medicare o Medicaid, 
against rent seeking behaviours of insurance companies, like forbidding both cream skimming and the rule of fixing a maximum 
amount of care, while foreseeing a limit for out-of-pocket expenditure. Second, the reform tends to create a publicly regulated 
market, where several insurance companies competitively supply bundles of homogeneous services, according to some common 
rules. Further, all the American citizens will be obliged to buy a health insurance, consequently individuals or firms unable to pay for 
the premiums will receive adequate tax allowances and benefits. This “new insurance exchange model” will be financed by general 
taxation and the expected efficiency gains from a higher competition respect to current situation where local insurance monopolies 
prevail in many states. 
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where to receive them. The internal hospitals and clinics are financed at costs of inputs or, sometimes, with 
reference to a fixed budget. Finally there is the contractual model where the funding body, the insurer or the 
health district, is separated from the providers which, whether public or private ones, are committed and 
rewarded according to a procurement contract. This is based on prices that in most cases are fixed ex-ante 
and standardised along the system of Diagnostic related groups (DRG). Consumers-patients generally have, 
according to the variety of contractual systems, freedom of choice of the provider and the general 
practitioner they desire to engage. Quasi-markets (QM) are a specific typology of the third model, often 
called managed or internal competition, applied in the last decades in some European countries (section 3.2). 
In the in block diagram of Fig. 1, we summarize how production of health services can be developed 
according to the various organizational systems while, in Fig.2, we summarize how provision of health 
services can be carried out, according to the various funding systems. In the blocks, some countries/systems 
combinations are inserted as reference. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Classification of HCSs according to production organization features 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Classification of HCSs according to provision and financing features 
 
The next two sections, 3 and 4, will expand such a double classification within respectively the 
production/organization and provision/financing frameworks. 
 
 
3. Health care industrial organization of production: separation versus integration  
 
3.1 The Cost-Benefit of vertical separation (integration) in health care industry  
 
The vertical separation of purchasing structures from producing and supplying ones is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for creating competition in health care industry. Thus, this institutional design issue 
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must be treated per se, by looking at cost-benefit of vertical integration in terms of production costs level, 
economies of scale and scope, network and coordination economies. Within this context, health economics 
can well consider the pros and cons of different organizational systems. Indeed, the transactions between a 
buyer, e.g. a health district, and seller, e.g. a hospital, can be realized by a market contractual exchange (in 
case of separation) or by a internal transfer within a unitary body (in case of integration). Therefore, for 
modelling the determinants of this choice, we have to consider the usual alternative between hierarchy and 
market, by comparing the administrative costs of managing a complex structure (the firm), with the costs for 
signing incomplete contracts with the providers (the market)6. Further, a variety of industrial issues matter, 
like the degree of complementarity of the purchasing and production assets, the rent-seeking behaviours of 
the several agents, those making the choice and those applying it for the relevant activities, the existence of 
sunk costs and irreversible investments and the consequent hold-up issue. Of course, all the transaction costs 
concerns, as the contractual size and complexity, and the time and costs requested for settling the eventual 
controversies on trial are also relevant (Williamson 2005). Thus, by limiting the opportunistic behaviours 
and ex-ante and ex-post contract inefficiency, the integration will be preferable to a system based on market 
exchanges and transactions. This will happen when its advantages can exceed the static and dynamic 
inefficiencies due to huge bureaucratic centralised structures, typical of public administration.  
We can formalize the different typologies of I-O schemes as follows. Let us employ these notations: 
A = set of institutions, such as national or regional authorities, devoted to regulating a public and/or 
private production,  
B =  set of agencies conveying the users demand and needs, and  
C = set of the suppliers of treatments and final services.  
Now, we have  
 
Table 1: Production organization systems 
Pure integrated model Ω≡∪∪ CBA  the union of the three sets, Ω, assembles all the health care 
activities 
Separated QM model ∅≡∩∩ CBA
 
the intersection of the three sets is empty because each set 
interact with the others by contractual exchanges  
Semi-integrated model ∅≡∩Ψ≡∪ CBA )(  A and B are joined in a union set Ψ, but the intersection of 
the latter with C is once again empty: Ψ buys services from 
C  
 
In a de-integrated (separated) model, ∅≡∩∩ CBA , as the Dutch one, there is a limited degree of 
industrial concentration. The tasks of expressing, on the behalf of patients, the demand and of establishing 
the appropriateness of services and treatments are delegated to a specific Authority, a public Sponsor of 
citizens. The providers are government or non-profit institutions, but they must be, in any case, appropriately 
ex-ante selected as “reliable providers”. The selection procedure aims at controlling and limiting the provider 
power in the negotiation due to asymmetric information and at assuring that the several necessities and 
urgencies of users are suitably fulfilled.  
In a public-public integrated model, Ω≡∪∪ CBA , like that one prevailing in some European 
regimes, there is a strong industrial integration, that, in the polar version, unifies in a whole structure, a 
“Local health firm”, as the ASL in Italy, all the functions of planning, demand rationing, financing, 
production and supply of services. In milder versions of the model, ∅≡∩Ψ≡∪ CBA )( , some hospital 
firms (AO) may be separated from the ASL, still remaining publicly owned. This semi-integrated 
configuration is wholly working in U.K, where there are a Health District Authority (HD) separated from the 
Trust hospitals (TH), which the patients can  almost freely choose as favourite. 
                                               
6
 For general surveys of this topic see Gibbons (2005), Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, ch. 10). 
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The main objective of the integration is to improve the capacity of coordination by the planner, by 
limiting the conflicting interests among the involved agents. This kind of conflict is, instead, considered 
beneficial by the advocates of the de-integrated model. Further, the integrated model is aimed at limiting the 
opportunistic manipulation of demand, which is often not objectively determinable, mainly on the social-
assistance components. However, the integrated model has all the shortcomings and defects of the 
centralised and complex structures, at high level of bureaucratization and high administrative costs (Dixit 
2002), and it suffers the politicians interference, in all the ways it can occur. Moreover, the model does not 
give adequate incentives toward the internal efficiency of the institutions (Le Grand 2003, 2007), whose lack 
becomes the main cause, together with the so called “soft budget constraint syndrome”, of the wide sunk 
deficits of the decentralised bodies (Rodden et al. 2001, Wildasin 2004). Consequently, on looking at the 
cost-benefit of separation vs. integration, considerations of Political economy should be taken into account. 
The application of new Political economy models (Besley 2007) to health economics allow to contemplate 
the behaviours and the conflicting relationships among citizens and politicians, the public providers and the 
interests groups, as the pharmaceutical industry and doctors profession (Zweifel et al. 2009, ch. 13). 
In conclusion, we summarize the pros and con of institutional design based on separation as follows.  
 
Table 2 Pros and cons of the separation in industrial health organization  
Benefits   Costs  
positive incentives from the interests conflict matching the 
demand by a ASL (HD) and the supply by the providers, as a 
AO (TH) 
a limited exploitation of economies of scale and scope (no gains 
from increasing returns and complementarities in cost structure) 
positive incentives from competition-quality-choice conduct 
arising from purchasing contracts 
high transaction costs for signing and implementing highly 
incomplete contracts 
 
more transparent accountancy procedures and better 
performance measurement   
lack of whole corporate view of the three management functions 
and consequently difficulty to effectively control demand and 
supply 
More management specialization on the three main functions 
and responsibilities: 
• Insurance (risk and need perception) 
• Production (measurement and control of costs 
and returns), 
• Purchasing (demand input controls) 
 
 
phenomena of demand induction from providers mainly boosted 
to increase the revenues 
Controls of costs and quality by Health Authority, acting as 
“aware bidder contractors” and not as a “blind purchasers” 
 
 
 
3.2. Separation plus competition: the quasi-markets 
 
A clear separation of structures, with ∅≡∩∩ CBA , is typical of Quasi-markets (QM), which are, as 
said, the most advanced form of the contractual model7. The features and the cost-benefit of such a model 
can be summarized as follows. 
 
Table 3 Managed competition and Quasi-markets in health care 
Advantages  Disadvantages  
limiting the productive role of the state, which could better 
specialize its effort working only as  purchaser of services, on 
the behalf of the citizens enrolled in the NHS 
 
possibly boosting cream-skimming procedures by providers  
                                               
7
 See Maynard (1994) and Jones e Cullies (1996) for two formal analyses of the working of an emblematic QM, like the English one 
during Margaret Thatcher’s era. For a systematic evaluation of the today NHS, after Tony Blair partial revisions of the latter, see the 
OCDE Report by Smith e Goddard (2009). 
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enhancing a beneficial competition among providers (mainly 
public ones). It is a monopolistic competition on the quality, as 
the prices of treatments are generally fixed 
requiring complex ex-ante and ex-post performance controls by a 
public body, or a  specific Authority, able also to properly 
regulate the internal market with plans and hard budgets, efficient 
bidding and contractual activities  
 
 
pushing up the voice of patients-consumers through the role of 
sponsor played by the insurers 
enhancing, contrary to what expected, both private and public 
health expenditure, owing to phenomena of moral hazard and of 
inducing distorted demand by highly competitive providers, 
engaged to acquire as many customers as possible 
allowing the exit of patients-consumers, giving them the 
freedom of choosing the preferred provider  
lack of incentive to efficiency if, in some areas, competition 
among hospitals is simply not possible, so local monopolies 
actually arise (industrial configuration failure) 
 
boosting cost-containing and quality enhancing actions 
together with the incentive to increase observable features of 
quality, there may be the incentive to decrease the not observable 
ones8 
boosting R&D activities in medical industries, as the hospitals, 
being “residual claimant”, can reinvest  the “profits” 
freedom of choice is somewhat misleading given the imperfect 
information of patients and the potentially non-benevolent pay-
off and behaviour of the physician prescribing the treatments. 
 
From Table 3, it turns out that managed competition may be socially desirable in some institutional and 
economic contexts but in other ones it actually does not work. Indeed, only a limited group of European 
countries have pushed their HCS reforms in toward a pure contractual-QM model. We may say that now in 
The Netherlands, U.K., Germany, Sweden, after several succeeding reforms in the nineties, quasi-markets 
organized in potentially pro-competitive systems are prevailing. In countries like Spain and Italy there are 
instead HCSs with only some elements of managed competition. Indeed, although they intended to introduce 
internal competition features, actually gave up to fully apply them, emphasizing instead their limits. Further, 
there are countries, like France, Denmark, Finland, that, even if aware of the defects of the purely planned 
systems in terms of incentive to efficiency, have introduced only very few or no pro-competitive items9. 
In the models where it is ∅≡∩∩ CBA  or ∅≡∩Ψ≡∪ CBA )( , the different techniques for 
rewarding the providers are crucial10, as  imply different cost-containing and quality-enhancing incentives 
(Ma 1994). The simple analytic model presented in Appendix (A.2) may enlighten these features. 
 
3.3. Ownership structures and investment task assignments in the hospitals 
 
The trade-off between cost-containment and quality can influence also the institutional design and the 
ownership options for health structures. As regard, particularly meaningful are recent extensions of the 
theory of property rights with incomplete contracts, treating the issue of delegation of responsibility on assets 
running, according to the incentives by private as well public managers to productive efficiency and quality 
of services (Hart 2003, Sadka 2007). The segmentation of a public firm in different branches, with out-
sourcing of some purchasing and selling activities, e.g. the separation of hospitals from the public health 
authorities, could be justified in terms of the assignment of investment tasks, i.e. the convenience of 
transferring the responsibility for certain elements of the treatments to private hands, while maintaining other 
elements in public hands.  
Hoppe and Schmitz (2010) have recently developed a model where contracts on the privatization of 
infrastructures projects, like new hospitals, do not only specify the transfer of ownership rights, but also 
assign the responsibility, regarding design construction, maintenance and modernization of the structure 
itself. Thus they consider a set of combinations public vs. private activities which appear very promising for 
                                               
8
 Propper et al. (2008) have shown that Trust hospitals competition in NHS, although has reduced average waiting lists (observable 
feature), has increased other non observables relevant features of quality, like death rates. 
9
 Notice as the model may even change among regions or states of a federal country, with decentralised health care, as we may say it 
happens in Italy, where in Lombardy there is a QM system and in Tuscany a somewhat command & control system. 
10
 The topic has been analysed by a large and complex literature, surveyed, among others by Chalkley and Malcomson (2000), 
Dranove and Sattherwaite (2000), Boadway et al. (2004) and Zweifel et al. (2009, ch. 10). 
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analysing health care industrial organization. Let take into account a situation where, at date 0, the 
government (G), in our case a health district (HD), and a manager (M) of a hospital write a contract that 
specifies a volume q of treatments, with features described ex-ante, and a payment T from G to M. When the 
manager provides the treatments he incur costs qC0, while the health district’s benefit is given by qB0, where 
B0>C0. The parties also agree on an ownership structure and an investment task assignment. 
The ownership structure { }NJGMo ,,,∈  determines who is in control of the hospital assets and 
equipments. Under private ownership (o=M), the manager has the right to modify the assets in order to 
implement innovations that may improve quality or reduce the production cost, enhancing x-efficiency. 
Under public ownership (o=G), the HD controls the essential infrastructures. There are also two kinds of 
partnerships. Under o=J, both parties have veto power, so that no one can implement any innovations 
without the partner’s consent, while, under o=N, each party has the right to modify the assets to implement 
innovations. The task assignment { }GMMGGMA ,,,∈  determines who is in charge of the two types of 
non-contractible investments, for reducing costs of providing treatments and enhancing quality, that can be 
made at date 1. The first type of innovation reduces the manager cost per unit, but at the same time it also 
lowers the quality and thus reduce the government’s benefit. The second type of investment results in a 
innovation that improves the treatment’s quality, so that the HD’s benefit per unit increase, but also increases 
of the hospital’s cost per unit. The assignment A=MG (resp. A=GM) means that the hospital manager (resp. 
the HD) is in charge of cost-containment investment task and the government (resp. the manager) is 
responsible for quality-enhancing investment task. The party in charge bears the associated investment costs. 
Finally, at date 2, the parties may renegotiate the quantity of the treatment to be provided, the decisions 
whether or not to implement the innovations, and the payment. The negotiations are modelled as Nash 
bargaining solutions, according to which the renegotiation surplus is divided between the parties. 
Let us concentrate on Hoppe and Schmitz propositions on the cost-benefit of ownership structure and tax 
assignment, leaving aside the propositions regarding the volume of treatments, and let consider the case 
o=G, where the ownership of the hospital is public one (Proposition 5ii). This case emerges as optimal when 
the negative side effect of the quality innovation is negligible. It is shown that, if M has a larger bargaining 
power than G, the preferred task assignment is A=MG, then M should be responsible for the cost investment 
and G for the quality investment. While, if G has a larger bargaining power than M, the preferred task 
assignment is A=G, then G should be responsible for both investments. Further Hoppe and Schmitz 
(Proposition 6) show that a partnership with no veto power (o=N) can be optimal only if the parties’ 
bargaining strengths do not become too asymmetric. When one party’s bargaining power becomes large it 
becomes impossible to find the quantity of production that balances the incentives for making both types of 
investments.   
Consequently, Hoppe and Schmitz results suggest, first, that partnerships between the public and the 
private sector in running a hospital should be carried out when the bargaining power is relatively balanced 
and if the side effects of cost and quality innovations are relatively unimportant. Second, they imply that 
public (private) ownership should prevail if the side effects of cost (quality) innovations are strong.  
In this respect, it is worth to notice that the private bargaining power is inversely related to the degree of 
competition among hospitals. However, the government’s bargaining power is likely to be weak ex-post 
since finding an alternative suppliers, during the renegotiation, is usually difficult. Moreover, it is 
empirically proved that the effect on hospital production costs of improving quality of treatments is quite 
high, given the needed sophisticate equipments. While, if the hospital is far from x-efficiency, a innovation 
reducing costs could imply relatively low side effects on quality.       
 
3.4 The alternative of non-profit organization for hospitals and nursing homes 
 
The ownership issue for hospitals and other facilities is not restricted to public/private dichotomy only. 
An intermediate solution is to build up a non-profit firm. Non-profits organizations generally espouse goals 
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other than profit maximization, such as, fairness, education, preservation of values, etc. For analysing the 
strategies chosen by an hospital management to pursue these ends we have to recall that its activity has a 
multi-product nature.  
For a non-profit firm some of products are “preferred”, i.e. mission-oriented services, although privately 
unprofitable goods, and other are “non-preferred”, i.e. minor services, although profitable revenue-goods. An 
efficient management of the hospital should consider this feature as an opportunity, as producing at the 
maximum profits the “non-preferred” products may provide means to the ends pursued by the “preferred” 
products (Weisbrod 2006). In other words some hospitals, as well as nursing homes, although legally defined 
as non-profit firms, with the consequent fiscal advantages, may seek to maximize profits derived from some 
but not all of its activities. Such a cross - subsidization could be beneficial from a second best perspective 
tending to maximize the implicit multidimensional objective function. 
Several empirical researches has examined mixed industries, mainly hospital, facilities for the mentally 
handicapped, nursing homes, showing behavioural differences in many dimensions: efficiency, mortality 
rates, satisfaction of staff members and among patient’s families. In particular, (Weisbrod 2006) has shown 
that observed behavioural differences across institutional forms reflect two specific perspectives. On one 
hand, different institutional forms face diverse constraints. For instance, w.r. t. profit firms, non-profit ones 
of course face a “nondistribution constraint” limiting the size of profit. While, w.r.t. governmental agencies, 
the non-profit institutions have access to volunteer labour and private donations of money. Moreover, 
according to the different institutions, Weisbrod (2006) has also shown that diverse organization objective 
functions arise, as they are manifest in managerial reward systems. In case of non-profit firms, the empirical 
analysis shows that differences in reward system may arise from strong incentives in the form of 
performance-based bonus to optimize their organizational objective functions, according to the several ends 
they pursue.  
Grabowsky et al. (2009) examine the increasing market of home care services in U.S.A.. These are 
mainly provided by private for profit agencies, reimbursed at cost-based payment systems, but recently also 
by an increasing number of non-profit firms. They show that the non-profit status is associated with shorter 
enrollment in home health care. Moreover, they show that non-profit home health care agencies, because 
they lack a residual claim, are less sensitive to a change towards a prospective payment system. With 
stronger incentive-correlated ways of reimbursement, patients at non-profit (profit) agencies have a lower 
(larger) decrease in length of home health care and lower (greater) increase in discharges without the goals of 
care having been met. This empirical result can be theoretically sustained by the model offered in Appendix 
(A.2). 
Thus, in case of a non-profit enterprise running an hospital or a agency, the simple model of Hoppe and 
Schmitz (2010) of previous section 3.3 should be extended in order to admit more complex contracts 
between G, the health district, and the manager, M. This should specify an ex-ante multi-product profile of 
treatments, associated with the several goals to be pursued, other than efficiency. The features of the 
payment rules will be more compound and, at the same time, constrained by much more relevant asymmetric 
information nuisances. 
 
 
4. Health care provision: compulsory versus voluntary ways of financing  
 
4.1 Health insurance framework for funding systems  
 
We may say that the logic of insurance applies more or less to all health care funding systems, also to the 
strictly public ones. Indeed, a treatment is, in any case, a risky event whose coverage should be guaranteed to 
risk averse individuals. The financing systems are generally distinguished according to the type of interaction 
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among the three main players in the health care game - the patient, the provider and a regulating entity11. 
Thus, a significant distinction comes from the way the patients (and the tax-payers) finance the 
institution/insurer. More specifically, we may distinguish as follows: 
 
Table 4 Funding health care expenditure 
Instruments Insurance systems 
Insurance premiums based on individuals risk and 
administrative costs 
voluntary private insurance policies 
Community rating insurance (CRI), based on average risk compulsory public insurance   
Health contributes (payroll-taxes) paid by employees and 
employers 
compulsory social insurance by categorical funds of non-profit 
enterprises 
General taxes devoted to health care spending  standard  National Health Service (NHS) 
 
It is clear that the pure insurance mechanism is running only in case of voluntary private insurance, 
where each policy breaks even and premiums are “fair”. In case of insurance with CRI an explicit cross-
subsidization from low risks to high risks is at work. In the other cases, subsidization is still present, although 
not explicitly. In the third one, in fact, the premium is arranged as a fraction of labour income, possibly with 
upper limits to the payment. Thus, as the risk of sickness is inversely correlated to the labour productivity 
(skill) and then to the income, also in this case, low risks tend to subsidize in the average the high risks. In 
the last case, the NHS, the insurance mechanism is of course quite mild, but actually it remains in 
aggregative terms. Indeed, the amount of resources coming from taxation and devoted to funding health care 
must cover ex-ante the aggregate value of insured risks, measured by the Essential levels of Health Care 
(ELC). However, in this case, the logic of insurance is inevitably violated if, removing such a constraint, the 
deficits are ex-post bailed-out by the government.  
When the insurance coverage is funded by general taxation, trade-offs arise between redistributive and 
insurance aims. In particular, being risks, as said, inversely correlated to income, the social coverage rate 
may reach redistribution objectives, helping the parallel role played by progressive taxation. Indeed, it has 
been shown that it the former can moderate the distortion effects of the latter.(Rochet 1991, Cremer and 
Pestieau 1996)12. We are going to analyse this issue in the following sub-section, here we propose a synthetic 
picture of the main OECD countries funding systems. 
 
Table 5 Financing systems of health care in OECD countries 
NHS supported by general taxation (Beveridgean models) Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
New Zeeland, Norway, Portugal Spain, Sweden, U.K. 
Social insurance systems financed by mandatory payroll 
contributes to Social Insurance Funds (Bismarkian models) 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands  (before 2006 reform), Poland  
Systems of private insurance, although compulsory, financed 
by CRI 
Switzerland, The Netherlands (after 2006 reform) 
Mixed social systems, as a combination of the three previous 
cases 
South Korea, Greece, Turkish, Slovakia, Czech Republic 
Systems with prevailing voluntary private insurance  U.S.A., with Medicaid e Medicare 
Mixed private systems financed by direct payments by 
patients  
Mexico 
Source: OCDE, Health data, year 2009 
 
                                               
11
 This is often called the Medical care triad, see Cutller and Zeckauser 2000. 
12
 For a analyses of European reforms in terms of integration or separation between redistribution and insurance aims see Breyer and 
Haufler (2000). 
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Mixed systems are prevailing in the groups of European welfare tradition countries. In particular in the 
first group, the Beveridgean NHSs, beside general taxation there are also social contributions or earmarked 
taxes on wages. This happens in U.K. but also in Italy. In the Bismarkian social insurance systems of the 
second and third group, the insurance funds are frequently integrated with resources from taxation system. 
U.S.A and Mexico systems are somewhat outliers. Quite interesting is the cross analysis of separation issue 
and funding issue to understand the complexity of health care systems. For instance, the U.K. NHS, though 
funded by general taxation, is characterized by an internal market with high industrial de-integration and 
large freedom of choice by patients (Smith and Goddard 2009), while, in the classical U.S private insurance 
system are working the Health Maintenance Organizations which follow a integrated model of industrial 
organization. 
Several European countries have a health care funding system structured in two or three “pillars”, but 
with meaningful differences in the size of each one (Mossialos and Thomson 2004, Zanette and Ricatti 2006, 
Gechert 2009). A first pillar is devoted to socially cover a uniform basic package of services (ELC) and a 
second one is devoted to a private integrative insurance for the remaining services. The existence of a partial 
social coverage in most NHSs is signalled by the several forms of rationing publicly provided services and 
treatments, according to their “appropriateness” and cost-effectiveness. The pillars may be three when a 
second pillar can be inserted within the previous two ones, with publicly regulated capitalization health 
funds. This second insurance setting, mainly organised by public municipalities and regions through 
“reliable” companies, plays the fundamental role of limiting the size of the purely private health spending 
remaining in the third pillar.  
The second pillar may refer to supplementary insurance, when it provides a double coverage to services 
in the statutory package. It could be the case to offer a perceived quality advantage over the care secured by 
the statutory package, e.g. in the form of reducing waiting times or access to superior facilities. The 
integrative insurance may be also complementary when offers full or partial cover for services excluded or 
not fully covered by the statutory package, like Long Term Care expenditures (in Germany), and for 
covering the liability for co-payments levied on ELC services (in France). 
 
4.2. On the theoretical foundation of a multi-pillar funding system 
 
The rationale and the features of these mixed systems have been widely investigated by theoretical 
health economics, following two streams of literature. The first one straight considers the social convenience 
of a public community rating insurance plus a supplementary private insurance. The second one analyses the 
more complex and more realistic case of three-pillar systems with distortionary income taxation financing 
the social component. We postpone this subject to the successive sub-section. 
We may say that the topic has been originally introduced in the theory of health insurance by Wilson 
(1977) seminal contribution. Wilson moves from a classical adverse selection Rothschild-Stiglitz separating 
equilibrium (RSSE), where, since the low risks are rationed, there may be scope for Pareto-improvements. 
The main result is that an improvement can be achieved by introducing compulsory insurance coverage. 
Wilson has modelled a health system where there is a mandatory public policy, just breaking even because 
lying in the pooling line pertinent to the population at large, and individuals are allowed to buy 
supplementary health insurance. Given this framework, it turns out that the pair of contracts (compulsory 
plus voluntary part) Pareto-dominates the RSSE without social insurance (Zweifel et al. 2009, p. 177). As 
shown also by Dahlby (1981), the new mixed equilibrium gives a full (partial) coverage insurance to high 
(low)-risks, as in RSSE, but now both contracts are preferred to the previous ones. The high-risk types 
benefit from cross-subsidization within the public insurance contract, while low-risks types are better off 
given the relaxation of the rationing restriction, allowing an increased overall coverage as compared to the 
absence of mandatory public insurance with partial coverage. This mixed two-pillar solution is even Pareto-
superior to a one-pillar public insurance with a uniform community rating for all individual. In fact, by 
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allowing an appropriate risk-selection, it reduces the effect of the tax burden to low-risks which have to pay 
for their insurance and for cross-subsidizing high-risks. 
Hansen and Keiding (2002) extend Wilson-Dahlby approach by providing a welfare comparison between 
three alternative health insurance regimes: (i) a unregulated voluntary market regime, where consumers 
either buy full coverage or no coverage; (ii) a compulsory and uniform universal regime with community 
rating; (iii) a compulsory, universal community-rated regime that allows private supplementary insurance. 
The novelties of their analysis are twofold: first, in order to make the welfare comparison between the 
community-rated insurance (CRI) regime and the voluntary private insurance one, they derive the level of 
the compulsory insurance as the equilibrium choice in a median voter model of political economy. Second, 
they base their comparison on either the Hicksian compensation principle (where the winners could 
compensate the losers), or a utilitarian average utility concept. These welfare criteria appear to be more 
meaningful than the simple Pareto-criterion, considered by Wilson-Dahlby approach, since compulsory 
insurance regimes are likely to make low risks worse off, assuming that the level of mandatory coverage 
regimes exceed the level that would be chosen voluntarily by low risks. Hansen and Keiding show that their 
voluntary full coverage reaches a higher average utility than the compulsory insurance determined by the 
median voter, under plausible hypotheses on the distribution of risks. Low risks are better off under the 
compulsory insurance status because they purchase insurance at reasonable cost, while they remain 
uninsured in the voluntary setting. High risks, instead, are worse off with compulsory coverage because they 
have less coverage than they would choose to buy in the voluntary market equilibrium, but this drawback is 
reduced if they can purchase risk-rated supplementary coverage. Hence it is welfare improving to permit 
supplementation to a compulsory CRI scheme. 
However, this result is not fully robust: changing slightly the context, we may reach different outcomes. 
Kifmann (2002), for instance, shows that if insurers that offer the basic CRI benefits are allowed also to offer 
the supplementary ones, the regime can only benefit low risks at the expense of high risks. The finding 
depends on Kifmann’s assumption that the community-rated insurers offer supplementary benefits that 
disproportionately attract low risks. Consequently a separating equilibrium is reached where the high risks 
buy the basic package from community-rated insurers, while the low risks buy the supplementary coverage 
from other insurers. This has the effect of reducing the transfer from low to high risks, as desired by the 
government, and leads the low risks to consume benefits worth less than their cost, because they avoid the 
cross-subsidy to high risks. This result seems more plausible if the supplementary package covers specific 
services that only appeal to relatively healthy individuals. 
Danzon (2002), by comparing, in a special issue of Journal of Health Economics, the contributions by 
Hansen and Keiding and Kifmann, concludes that “…the welfare effects of permitting supplementation of 
compulsory, community-rated insurance depend critically on who buys the supplementary coverage and how 
the supplementation affects the rating of the basic coverage. Supplementary coverage is more likely to be 
welfare improving if it is bought primarily by high risks, for whom the basic coverage is presumably 
suboptimal. This result is more likely if the supplementary benefit is offered by separate insurers”.  
Different insurance regimes have impacts not only in terms of efficiency but also in terms of wealth 
vertical redistribution. In this respect, Leach (2010), from a pure redistributive perspective given by a social 
aversion to the inequality13, looks for the optimal a health care system among a fully private insurance, a 
fully public (social) insurance and a mixed insurance (public insurance with a supplementary private one). 
By comparing the first two extreme solutions, the author shows that with the optimal public health care 
system, people who are relatively unhealthy, with and without treatment, receive more health care, and 
people who are relatively healthy, with and without treatment, receive less health care. However, the 
aggregate quantity of health care under the optimal public regime might be either greater or less than under 
private one. When there is a mixed system, with both public and private insurance, the latter covering 
                                               
13
 There is a strictly concave ex post social welfare function over agents who are ex-ante identical, differing ex-post in the state of 
their health. 
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treatment for types that are not covered by the former, it may happen that, in an equality-averse society, the 
role of private insurance is almost negligible. The parallel system of private health insurance tends in fact to 
reduce welfare with respect to an optimally designed entirely public system. 
The first stream of literature is, other than fairly inconclusive, not completely satisfactory in modelling a 
multi-pillar system. Even if we derive, as in Hansen and Keiding (2002), a social preference for a mixed 
system, where a public compulsory insurance, covering a package of essentials, is integrated by a private 
policy topping up the remaining services, we have no indication on the optimal composition of the total 
insurance, i.e. the number and the size of the pillars. The most convincing analyses for analysing multi-pillar 
health insurance systems come from contributions modelling the social insurance in the first pillar as a 
redistribution device financed by a distortional income tax14. This kind of model reflects the phenomenon of 
frequent interaction between social and private insurance now characterizing many sectors of welfare states 
in industrialised countries (Chetty and Saez 2010). 
 
4.3 Three-pillar system with optimal income taxation 
 
Blomqvist and Johansson (1997) and Selden (1997) considered a multi-pillar public/private health 
insurance system, but without an income-dependent contribution to social insurance with a variable labour 
supply. Petretto (1999) extends the two contributions in this way. He models a NHS with a supplementary 
private insurance, but where  low-risk or rich people are not allowed to opt-out of the NHS. Thus a three-
pillar system is modelled so that the health services purchase by an individual is matched by three funding 
components: the social insurance, the supplementary private insurance policy and the out-of-pocket 
expenditure. The social insurance is financed by a linear income tax, whose structure is optimally chosen, 
together with the social insurance coverage, by the government. This faces n types of individuals 
distinguished by two parameters, the probability of illness and skills (wage in efficiency units). There is ex 
post moral hazard with regard to health expenditure and adverse selection from the government perspective, 
as it cannot observe individual’s skill parameter. Moreover, although the probabilities of illness are however 
known, the government cannot differentiate its tax policy between high-risk and low-risk individuals, but 
only according to their personal incomes.  
In this framework, the individual’s equilibrium private coinsurance rate follows the standard condition of 
optimal insurance with ex post moral hazard. This requires, as in condition (4) in section 2, to equalising, at 
the margin, the gain of risk-sharing with the deadweight loss due to moral hazard effect for each individual. 
The private insurance contract, signed by individual i, includes a coinsurance rate ki(.), which is a “reaction 
function” of social policy instruments, i.e. the payroll tax rate t and the social insurance rate, α. Thus Pi=(1-
α)ki(α,t) may be considered as the individual i “unit price” for health expenditure Ei or his unit cost of the 
service out-of-pocket consumption.  
Thus with  
(9) 
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we measure the change of this price due to social insurance, which is negative for a sufficiently inelastic 
reaction of private insurance to its social counterpart (crowding-out effect). 
As far as the optimal social insurance rate α* is concerned, this is given by equalizing the sum of two 
marginal social benefits (the l.h.s) with a marginal social cost (the r.h.s) as follows (Petretto (1999, formula 
(19 and 20))15:  
 
(10)   SRSG+SRG=SMHC 
where 
                                               
14
 As said, in the previous sub-section, this issue has been firstly analysed by Rochet (1991) and Cremer and Pestieau (1996), but 
without investigating a multi-pillar setting. 
15
 The terms with “bar” are expected values and the terms not identified with i are average values in the population. 
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On the l.h.s., SRGS represents the social-risk sharing gain from a marginal increase of social insurance 
coverage, α,  and is given by a measure of the benefit for the whole society from “buying” a further 
insurance policy with uniform reimbursement rate for all members. α is higher, the higher is the sum of 
individuals’ gains of risk sharing, referring to out-of-pocket health spending. The gain from risk-pooling is 
somewhat socialised in two ways: first, by following a utilitarian welfare function rule, i.e. summing up the 
individual covariances between marginal utility of income and out-of-pocket health expenditure; second, by 
considering, as in the classical optimal taxation framework, each individual’s “social” (i.e. measured in terms 
of government revenue) expected marginal utility of income, ib . The term SRG represents the social 
redistribution gain stressing the role of α* for vertical equity aims. The higher is the distributional 
characteristics of health spending, ),( iiE EbCov=ξ , the higher is the optimal rate α*, as in the standard 
model of many-consumers optimal commodity taxation, with a linear income tax. Indeed social insurance 
coverage works like a subsidy applied to health expenditure at a uniform rate. On the r.h.s., SMHC represents 
a social moral hazard cost as a weighted sum of two individual’s moral hazard effects: the first comes from 
private budget constraints and it is linked to the sum of individual effects in terms of expected health 
expenditure increase; the second is determined by government budget constraint and is related to the effect 
on total public expenditure due to social health insurance. 
Boadway et al. (2006) extend Petretto (1999) by adding adverse selection on the distribution of risks to 
ex-post moral hazard. In their model, private insurers are well informed about households productivity so can 
offer separate insurance policies to persons of different income classes. But, since risk class cannot be 
observed, insurance policies must be designated to separate high risk from low-risk persons, as in 
Rothschild-Stiglitz model. In other words, within each productivity class, there is an insurance market 
equilibrium separating the two risk subclasses where insurers offer policies (premium and coverage) for L 
(low-risk) and H (high-risk) households of productivity class i, choosing their most preferred policy. 
Insurance companies are then better informed than government, which can observe neither risk class nor 
productivity. This gives advantage to private insurers thereby making the case for social insurance as strong 
as possible.  
The most plausible circumstances contemplated by the model actually design situations where there is 
room for private insurance (the second pillar), given the presence of partial social insurance (the first pillar). 
Neither high-risk persons or low-risk persons have full insurance given ex-post moral hazard and then, as in 
Petretto (1999), there is an out-of-pocket component of health expenditure (the third pillar). As far as the 
choice of the optimal social coverage rate, Boadway et al. find an expression extending in many respects 
condition (15) by Petretto. Given the adverse selection context, it is analogous to the standard expression for 
linear income tax rate, combining equity and efficiency concerns, except that it includes additional terms 
reflecting the various margins of distortion of the economy. Boadway et al. (2006, formula (12-17)) are in 
fact able to explicit α* as follows: 
 
(11) 
  
][
][][][*
MH
ASLDEq ++
=α  
 
where  
[Eq] = equity term, i.e. the covariance over all types between the marginal expected social valuation of 
income and health care spending,  
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[LD] = efficiency term, i.e. the indirect effect of social insurance on labour supply distortion,  
[AS] =  adverse selection term, for fulfilling self-selection constraints, and  
[MH] =  moral hazard term, linked to the compensated total change in the demand for health care spending 
w.r.t. α.  
As in Petretto (1999), at the optimum of a three stages game, for plausible hypotheses, a interior solution 
arises, such that 0< α*<1. This result implies that, for designing a mixed insurance system, a uniform social 
insurance rate is justified on the basis of equity as well efficiency considerations. Therefore, the first pillar, 
although essential and probably with a significant size, in general, does not guarantee a full social coverage: 
some services must be rationed, looking at their “appropriateness”, and further expenditures must be 
financed with supplementary insurance and co-payment (out-of-pocket).  
Table 5 summarises the logic of mixed insurance system, by representing the sequential decision-making 
structure implying three pillars, to be solved by backward induction. 
 
Table 6 The three-stage, three-pillar, game with asymmetric information  
STAGE 1 Optimal social  insurance rate, 0< α*<1 and optimal income tax rate t*, with a trade-
off equity-efficiency 
STAGE 2 Supplementary insurance, given α and t, with optimal coinsurance rate 
STAGE 3 Out-of-pocket expenditure (co-payment), given the two insurances 
 
 
4.4 Toward a general theory of optimal taxation with endogenous private insurance 
 
The logic of multi-pillar funding may be extended to the more general issue of looking for the optimal 
amount of redistribution taxation and social insurance. Chetty and Saez (2010) has recently developed a 
quite general model, with moral hazard and adverse selection, where social and private insurance, in terms of 
linear contracts based on individual income, interact each other. They extend Petretto (1999), by considering 
several combinations of optimal tax rates, and Boadawy et al. (2006) too, by admitting  private and public 
insurers to have the same informational set, being in other words unable to observe both risks and abilities.  
Chetty and Saez contribution is mainly devoted to correct the standard optimal income tax formula with 
the presence of a private insurance. In this respect, their various tax formula extend the one provided by 
Petretto (1999, (21) and (22)), applying to many forms of social insurance, not only health insurance, and 
given the adverse selection in a continuum of individuals. However, just for giving a sketch, let us ignore the 
latter and denote with tS the “tax rate” chosen by the government and with tp the “tax rate” in the private 
insurance contract. The two rates give the extent respectively of social and private insurance.  
Let z denote the earning of type-n individual and ∫= dnnzfZ )(  the average value in the population. 
The individuals are risk-averse so would like to insure themselves against the risk of having low-income 
realizations (e.g. due to a treatment expenditure) and Ztztw pp +−= )1(  is the net-of-private insurance 
income. Government taxation applies to the net incomes w16, thus ∫=+−= dnnwfWWtwtc ss )(,)1( , is 
the final, after the two insurances, disposable income. Let τ denote the total tax rate, defined as (1-τ)=(1-
tp)(1-ts), and now Zzc ττ +−= )1( . If the private insurer and the government cooperated to set τ, to 
maximise social welfare, the resulting contract would be identical to that described in the standard optimal 
taxation setting. However, as pointed out in Petretto (1999) and Boadway et al. (2006), private insurers take 
the government contract ts as given when they chose tp, and tp(ts) is the corresponding reaction function, 
analogous to ki(.) previously used. 
                                               
16Here we are presenting the case where private insurance is not optimally chosen. For the extension two a multi-stage game where 
also consumers optimizes the choice of insurance see Proposition 2 of Chatty and Saez paper. 
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Chatty and Saez show that, taking the function )( sps ttt →  as given, the optimal government tax 
formula is as follows (u’ is marginal utility of income and U’ is the average in the population): 
(12) 
'
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−=  denotes the empirically observed rate at which public insurance crowds out private 
insurance. If r=0, there is not crowd-out. If r=1, there is perfect crowd. )1log(
log
1,
s
tw td
Wd
s
−
=
−
ε  denotes the 
elasticity of average, post-insurance, income w.r.t. the net-of-tax rate (1-ts), taking into account the 
endogenous response of private insurance tp to a change in ts.  
According to (12), private insurance affects the formula for optimal tax rate in two ways. First, the term 
–tp on the r.h.s. reflects the reduction in the optimal level of government taxation given the presence of 
private insurance. Second, the standard inverse elasticity term 
'
)',(1
1, WU
uwCov
stW
−
−
ε
 is multiplied by (1-
r)<1, making the optimal government tax rate, and then social insurance, once more smaller. Such a 
integration designs a multi-pillar structure for many social protection sectors, and then also for health care.  
 
5. Some empirical comparisons and concluding remarks 
 
In this work we surveyed the HCSs, trying to follow an approach coherent with economic theory. A 
specific aim was to disentangle the boundary between public and private institutional involvement, even if 
we find out that this boundary is not always meaningful for enlightening the differences among systems. Let 
us give some synthetic sketches of the arguments carried on.  
First of all, on examining the features of public intervention in health care, it is necessary to distinguish 
the motives for public provision from those for public production. The two notions do not coincide and the 
two forms of public intervention should not be examined jointly. Further, when public production is 
preferred, this can be integrated or separated from the purchasing of health services made by a public entity 
or a insurer, on the behalf of the citizens enrolled in the NHS. The choice of this configuration may be 
usefully analysed in terms of the I-O and property rights theory of cost-benefit of vertical integration of a 
firm. However, we do not achieve a theoretical conclusive answer to this important institutional question, 
that must be therefore verified according to the prevailing socio-economic context.  
The health care organization systems are a lot, a sort of continuum, but they are independent on the 
funding systems. For instance the NHS of UK, is almost fully public in funding (Table 7). However, it is a 
managed competition system with the separation of public Trust hospitals from the District health 
authorities. Moreover, the freedom by patients, and general practitioners, in choosing the providers and the 
producers of services is allowed.  
HCSs with strong private insurances, like in USA, are quite costly and lack adequate coverage of 
sickness risks. Consequently, they are now everywhere integrated with social insurance, as the recent 
Obama’s reform proposes. However, also a fully centralised command & control system finds it hard to 
reach the planned equity aims, given the lack of information by the planner and the conflicting individual 
incentives of the many involved agents. These systems have been as well generally dropped out by the 
reforms toward mixed systems carried on in most European countries in the last three decades. 
Among the mixed systems, the managed competition in health care is a widely applied regime in Europe. 
I might reach appreciable results in terms of efficiency and equity. However, it needs a fairly territorial 
distribution of good-quality providers and it calls for complicated and costly mechanisms of contracts 
regulation and ex-ante and ex-post controls.  
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Table 6 Health expenditure by financing agent in 5 EU countries 
 Sweden France Germany Italy U.K. 
GENERAL 
GOVERNMENT 
81.5    78  76.9 77,9 84.1 
a. Territorial government 81.5   5.5   8.7 77.7 84.1 
b. Social security funds  
 
72.5 68.2   0.2 
 
PRIVATE SECTOR 18.5  22 23.1 22.1 15.9 
a. Private insurance   0.2 13.3   9.3   1.0   1.1 
b. Household out-of-pocket 16.7   72  13.1 19.7 10.5 
c. Non-profit institutions 
serving households 
  0.2   0.1   0.4   1.4   3.7 
d. Corporations   1.4   1.4    0. 3 
  
 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: OCDE, Health data, year 2009 
 
As said, the issue separation versus integration in production has no relevance on the boundaries between 
private and public financing means. If we pick up two countries where there are two different production 
organizations, an integrated and bureaucratic one as in France, and a separated one as in The Netherlands, we 
see, somewhat surprising, that the structure linking financing agencies to providers is not so different (Table 
7). In both countries, general government finances the same level of hospitals expenditure, about one third, 
although hospitals in France are internal to the Public Administration (a vertical integrated system), while 
Dutch hospitals, even if public ones, are outside the P.A. (a classical universalistic marketed HCS).A greater 
difference there is in residential care facilities industry, as in the separated system the public expenditure is 
higher in percentage because the externalized agencies are more numerous. 
 
Table 7 Providers per financing institutions: expenditure composition (%) 
       PROVIDERS 
FRANCE Integrated 
model for production 
Hospitals Residential care 
facilities 
Ambulatory health 
care 
Retail sale of medical 
goods 
A. General Government  32.7  7 19.6 13.5 
B. Private sector  2.8 - 7.3 6.2 
NETHERLANDS 
Separated model for 
production 
Hospitals Residential care 
facilities 
Ambulatory health 
care 
Retail sale of medical 
goods 
A. General Government 33.1 22.7 13,4 9.6 
B. Private sector 0.6 0.1 9.1 3.8 
Source: OCDE, Health data, year 2009  
 
All the health care funding systems, the NHSs too, tend to follow the logic of insuring individual risks, 
and fulfilling, at the same time, an aggregate financial equilibrium. In this respect, the theory shows that a 
mixed system with of a social insurance, for an essential package of services, and a supplementary and 
integrative private insurance might represent an efficient configuration.  
In many European HCSs the second pillar in health care is financed by integrative insurance funds, even 
public ones (Table 6). In some countries, like Italy, there are somewhat polar systems where the wideness of 
the first pillar, given the increasing comprehensiveness of the ELC packages, has limited the expansion of 
the second pillar, actually preventing the achievement of a meaningful role by integrative insurance funds. 
However, in these cases, the large extent of essential package in the first pillar has not limited the size of the 
third pillar which has been instead increasing in the time. In Table 7 we see that in Italy, where the 
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integrative insurance is still more limited than in France or Germany (1,0 respect to 13,3 and 9,3) the 
household out-f-pocket expenditure is much higher (19,7 against respectively 7,2 and 13,1).  
A system with an increasing range of treatments and services included in the essential package and 
strictly funded with central government taxation, although justified by equity concerns, could become, in the 
long run, unsustainable for the financial equilibria and for the level of aggregate tax burden. In perspective, 
the sustainability problems could be limited by widening the second pillar, together with a system of co-
payments, even income-related. Despite several institutional problems, and often large administrative and 
transaction costs (Gechert 2010), this mixed system could assure the feature of universality with a high 
degree of public provision of health care services. 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
A.1. Essential levels of health care and co-payment 
 
Let 
(A.1)    ),,( iiiii vYmTWP ϕ≡   
be the function of the total willingness to pay by i for the treatment mi, given his income Yi  and utility level 
ii vU =(.) (the desired well-being). Consequently the marginal willingness to pay is as follows:  
(A.2)   
i
i
iii
i
m
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∂
−=
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If the government is committed to guarantee to every citizen the access to a ELC of m, it is reasonable to 
think that the government gives to the treatment a higher marginal evaluation than that one recognised by the 
individual himself: 
 (A.3)   )( iiiGi mMWPMWP ω+=  
Therefore, according to government evaluation, the amount of numeraire the individual should, be 
willing to spend for buying the treatment mi and reaching the desired utility level iv , is:  
(A.4)    
χχωϕϕ dvYmvYmTWP
m
m
i
i
iii
i
ii
G
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G
m0  is the level of the service behind which the public marginal evaluation is deviating from that one of 
the individual as such. It can be shown that to (A.4) it corresponds the level of well-being 
∫+=
m
m
iii
i
ii
g
G
dYmUYmU
0
])(,[),( χχω , achievable with a lump sum subsidy to i. Alternatively, the 
consumer price for the service i has to face must be lower than the producer price, in order to push his 
consumption over the level he otherwise would choose, until the specified essential level.  
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Fig.1a: Social service and access to the essential level of health care 
 
The expression χχω dm
m
iG )(
0
∫−  represents the area of Fig. 1a between the two curves of marginal 
evaluation, by the government and by the individual, thus the area of public responsibility for the service 
provision. In the horizontal axis, m1 > Gm0  is the market solution where the private MWP is equal to the 
marginal (standardised) cost Cs. ELC is the consumption socially guaranteed, given by crossing the bold 
curve MWPG with Cs line, which corresponds, at the same time, to the level at which private MWP curve is 
crossing the co-payment line Pi<Cs. Notice that the co-payment is zero when the MWPG is the dotted curve, 
ELC=mmax and the whole expenditure is borne by the government. 
 
 
A.2 Tariffs for health services and incentives in separated and semi-integrated models   
 
Let a tariff for a hospital treatment be given by this linear function: 
 
(A.5)     10);,,( ≤≤+= beqCbaT µ  
where C(.) is the production cost of the volume of treatments q; 0>
∂
∂
≡
q
CCq  is the marginal cost. 
],[ maxmin eee ∈  is the cost-containment effort carried on by the hospital manager and 0<∂
∂
≡
e
CCe  its 
marginal effect on the level of cost, with 0<
∂
∂
e
Ce
, for regulatory concerns. ],[
maxmin µµµ ∈  represents the 
quality of the treatment and 0>
∂
∂
≡
µµ
CC  its marginal cost, positive as clearly higher quality requires more 
resources, with now 0>
∂
∂
µ
µC
. Let us suppose that a HD or a ASL plan establishes a given volume of output 
MWP MWPG 
m
G
0 ELC m1 mmax 0
 
Pi 
m 
Cs 
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to be provided, so q=q* is inserted in the contract signed with the hospital (TH or AO). Both e and µ are 
instead not observable by the HD and then are not contractible, while production costs of the TH are only ex-
post observable, i.e. when realised. Let then define with ψ(e,µ) the objective function of the manager of the 
hospital, where 0<
∂
∂
≡
e
e
ψψ  represents the marginal cost of cost-containment effort (disutility), with 
0>
∂
∂
e
eψ
, and 0>
∂
∂
≡
µ
ψψ µ  the marginal benefit of quality in terms of prestige and reputation of the 
manager, with 0<
∂
∂
µ
ψ µ
. 
In a separated or semi-integrated system, a residual claimant provider will tend to choose e and µ to 
maximize the following difference function: 
 
(A.6)     R=T-C(q*,e,µ)-ψ(e,µ) = a-(1-b) C(q*,e,µ) +ψ(e,µ) 
 
In the case of a fee-for-service tariff (cost-plus contract), as in both reimbursement and integrated 
models, we have b=1. Therefore, it is  
T=a+C(q*,e,µ) and R=a+ψ(e,µ)  
i.e. the residual is independent on production costs, so there is no incentive to contain them. Indeed, 
theoretically, the optimal level of the hospital manager effort is a corner solution such that min1
*
ee
b
=
=
. 
However, being fully insured, the manager does not exploit the informative monopoly and might give up 
cream-skimming procedures and provide high quality treatments. Therefore, it might well happen a further 
corner solution such that max1
* µµ =
=b
. 
In the case of a fixed per treatment tariff (fixed-price contract), i.e. b=0, as in pure QM contractual 
model, where there is a prospective DRG payment, it is  
T=a and R=a-C(q*,e,µ)+ψ(e,µ).  
Since the residual is now decreasing with the treatment production cost, the hospital has an effective 
incentive to contain it. The optimal level of the effort is given by the condition eeC ψ=  implying that 
min1
*
0
*
eee
bb
=>
==
. However the hospital, bearing the full firm risk, may be induced to cream-skim high 
illness risks and to restrain the quality level of the service; indeed, in this case, the optimal quality level is 
given by condition Cµ=ψµ, and max1
*
0
* µµµ =<
== bb
. In more concrete terms, a fixed-price contract, 
without a reliable ex-ante selection of providers and effective controls on standards, may entail a worsening 
of treatment quality, with for instance a higher rate of patients mortality. 
This simple model seems to suggest that, in order to reach an adequate standard of quality but satisfying 
a fixed budget constraint, a mixed systems of cost and risk-sharing payment, with 0<b<1, might be 
preferable. The optimal levels e0 and µ0 are now given by the conditions (1-b) eeC ψ=  and (1-b)Cµ=ψµ, 
according to which it obtains  min1
*0
0
* eeee
bb
=>>
==
 and max1
*0
0
* µµµµ =<<
== bb
. 
Actually, a incentive risk-sharing criterion may be pursued by organising a system of budgeted plans 
based on a fixed volume of treatments, some proxy indexes of quality, and standardised and verifiable costs, 
with ex-post revenues abatements in presence of non-fulfilments of the objectives. 
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